A Self-supervised Approach for Adversarial Robustness by Naseer, Muzammal et al.
A Self-supervised Approach for Adversarial Robustness
Muzammal Naseer∗†‡, Salman Khan†, Munawar Hayat†, Fahad Shahbaz Khan†§, Fatih Porikli∗
∗Australian National University, Australia, ‡Data61-CSIRO, Australia
†Inception Institute of Artificial Intelligence, UAE, §CVL, Linko¨ping University, Sweden
{muzammal.naseer,fatih.porikli}@anu.edu.au
{salman.khan,munawar.hayat,fahad.khan}@inceptioniai.org
Abstract
Adversarial examples can cause catastrophic mistakes in
Deep Neural Network (DNNs) based vision systems e.g., for
classification, segmentation and object detection. The vul-
nerability of DNNs against such attacks can prove a major
roadblock towards their real-world deployment. Transfer-
ability of adversarial examples demand generalizable de-
fenses that can provide cross-task protection. Adversar-
ial training that enhances robustness by modifying target
model’s parameters lacks such generalizability. On the
other hand, different input processing based defenses fall
short in the face of continuously evolving attacks. In this pa-
per, we take the first step to combine the benefits of both ap-
proaches and propose a self-supervised adversarial train-
ing mechanism in the input space. By design, our defense
is a generalizable approach and provides significant robust-
ness against the unseen adversarial attacks (e.g. by reduc-
ing the success rate of translation-invariant ensemble at-
tack from 82.6% to 31.9% in comparison to previous state-
of-the-art). It can be deployed as a plug-and-play solu-
tion to protect a variety of vision systems, as we demon-
strate for the case of classification, segmentation and de-
tection. Code is available at: https://github.com/
Muzammal-Naseer/NRP.
1. Introduction
Adversarial training (AT) has shown great potential to
safeguard neural networks from adversarial attacks [33, 40].
So far in literature, AT is performed in the model space i.e.,
a model’s parameters are modified by minimizing empir-
ical risk for a given data distribution as well as the per-
turbed images. Such AT strategy results in the following
challenges. (a) Task dependency: AT is task-dependent
e.g. robust classification models cannot directly be incor-
porated into an object detection or a segmentation pipeline,
since the overall system would still require further training
Purifier 
Network
Until Converge
Perturbed Image Clean Image Purified Image
Perceptual 
Feature Space
Maximize 
Feature 
Distortion ∆G Minimize Feature Distortion ∆H
∆G
SSP
∆H
Figure 1: Our main idea is to train a Purifier Network in a self-
supervised manner. We generate perturbed images using our pro-
posed Self-supervised Perturbation (SSP) attack that disrupts the
deep perceptual features. The Purifier Network projects back the
perturbed images close to the perceptual space of clean images.
This creates a training loop independent of the task or label space.
with modified task-dependant loss functions. (b) Computa-
tional cost: AT is computationally expensive [33] which re-
stricts its applicability to high-dimensional and large-scale
datasets such as ImageNet [39]. (c) Accuracy drop: mod-
els trained with AT lose significant accuracy on the original
distribution e.g. ResNet50 [19] accuracy on ImageNet vali-
dation set drops from 76% to 64% when robustified against
PGD attack [33] at a perturbation budget of only  ≤ 2
(i.e. maximum change in each pixel can be 2/255). (d) La-
bel leakage: supervised AT suffers from label leakage [26]
which allows the model to overfit on perturbations thus af-
fecting model generalization to unseen adversaries [56].
In comparison to AT, input processing methods [16, 50]
for adversarial defense are scalable and can work across dif-
ferent tasks. However, they have been broken in white-box
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settings [2] and shown to be least effective in black-box
settings. For example, [10] successfully transfer their at-
tack against multiple input processing based defenses even
when the backbone architecture is adversarially trained us-
ing [48]. Furthermore, input transformations (e.g., Gaus-
sian smoothing and JPEG compression) can maximize the
attack strength instead of minimizing it [37, 10].
Motivated by the complementary strengths of AT and in-
put processing methods, we propose a self-supervised AT
mechanism in the input space. Our approach (Fig. 1) uses
a min-max (saddle point) formulation to learn an optimal
input processing function that enhances model robustness.
In this way, our optimization rule implicitly performs AT.
The main advantage of our approach is its generalization
ability, once trained on a dataset, it can be applied off-
the-shelf to safeguard a completely different model. This
makes it a more attractive solution compared to popular
AT approaches that are computationally expensive (and thus
less scalable to large-scale datasets). Furthermore, in com-
parison to previous pre-processing based defenses that are
found to be vulnerable towards recent attacks, our defense
demonstrates better robustness. Our main contributions are:
• Task Generalizability: To ensure a task independent AT
mechanism, we propose to adversarially train a purify-
ing model named Neural Representation Purifier (NRP).
Once trained, NRP can be deployed to safeguard across
different tasks, e.g., classification, detection and segmen-
tation, without any additional training (Sec. 3).
• Self-Supervision: The supervisory signal used for AT
should be self-supervised to make it independent of la-
bel space. To this end, we propose an algorithm to train
NRP on adversaries found in the feature space in random
directions to avoid any label leakage (Sec. 3.1).
• Defense against strong perturbations: Attacks are con-
tinuously evolving. In order for NRP to generalize, it
should be trained on worst-case perturbations that are
transferable across different tasks. We propose to find
highly transferable perceptual adversaries (Sec. 4.3).
• Maintaining Accuracy: A strong defense must concur-
rently maintain accuracy on the original data distribution.
We propose to train the NRP with an additional discrimi-
nator to bring adversarial examples close to original sam-
ples by recovering the fine texture details (Sec. 4.2).
2. Related Work
Defenses: A major class of adversarial defenses pro-
cesses the input images to achieve robustness against ad-
versarial patterns. For example, [16] used JPEG compres-
sion to remove high-frequency components that are less im-
portant to human vision using discrete cosine transform. A
compressed sensing approach called Total Variation Mini-
mization (TVM) was proposed in [16] to remove the small
localized changes caused by adversarial perturbations. Xie
et al. [51] introduced the process of Random Resizing and
Padding (R&P) as a pre-processing step to mitigate the ad-
versarial effect. A High-level representation Guided De-
noiser (HGD) [29] framework was used as a pre-processing
step to remove perturbations. NeurIPS 2017 Defense Com-
petition Rank-3 (NeurIPS-r3) approach [47] introduced a
two step prep-processing pipeline where the images first
undergo a series of transformations (JPEG, rotation, zoom,
shift and sheer) and then passed through an ensemble of
adversarially trained models to obtain the weighted output
response as a prediction. [41] proposed to recover adver-
saries using GAN and [35] super-resolve images to mini-
mize adversarial effect. As compared to the above defenses,
we design an input processing model that derives a self-
supervised signal from the deep feature space to adversari-
ally train the defense model. Our results show significantly
superior performance to all so-far developed input process-
ing based defenses.
Attacks: The self-supervised perturbation signal ob-
tained to adversarially train our proposed approach can also
be used as an adversarial attack. Since the seminal work
of Szegedy et al. [46], many adversarial attack algorithms
[14, 15, 3, 9] have been proposed to show the vulnera-
bility of neural networks against imperceptible changes to
inputs. A single-step attack, called Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM), was proposed in [14]. In a follow-up
work, Kurakin et al. [15] proposed a robust multi-step at-
tack, called Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (I-FGSM)
that iteratively searches the loss surface of a network under
a given metric norm. To improve transferability, a variant
of I-FGSM, called momentum iterative fast gradient sign
method (MI-FGSM), was introduced [9], which signifi-
cantly enhanced the transferability of untargeted attacks on
ImageNet dataset [39] under a l∞ norm budget. More re-
cently, [53] proposed a data augmentation technique named
input diversity method (DIM) to further boost the trans-
ferability of these attack methods. In contrast to our self-
supervised attack approach, all of these methods are super-
vised adversarial attacks that rely on cross-entropy loss to
find the deceptive gradient direction.
3. Neural Representation Purifier
Our defense aims to combine the benefits of adversarial
training and input processing methods in a single frame-
work that is computationally efficient, generalizable across
different tasks and retains the clean image accuracy. The
basic intuition behind our defense mechanism is to effec-
tively use information contained in the feature space of deep
networks to obtain an automatic supervisory signal. To
this end, we design a Neural Representation Purifier (NRP)
model that learns to clean adversarially perturbed images
based on the automatically derived (self) supervision.
The objective is to recover the original benign image x
Figure 2: Neural Representation Purifier. Using a self-supervision signal, the proposed defense learns to purify perturbed images, such
that their corresponding perceptual representation in deep feature space becomes close to clean natural images.
given an input adversarial image x′. We wish to remove
the adversarial patterns by training a neural network Pθ pa-
rameterized by θ, which we refer as the purifier network.
The main objective is to be independent of the task-specific
objective function, such that once trained, the proposed de-
fense is transferable to other models (even across tasks).
Towards this end, the network Pθ is trained in an adver-
sarial manner by playing a game with the critic network Cφ,
and a feature extractor Fψ (see Fig. 2). The function of
the purifier and critic networks is similar to generator and
discriminator in a traditional Generative Adversarial Net-
work (GAN) framework, with the key difference that in our
case, Pθ performs image restoration instead of image gener-
ation. The feature extractor, Fψ , is pretrained on ImageNet
and remains fixed, while the other two networks are opti-
mized during training. Adversarial examples x′ are created
by maximizing the Fψ’s response in random directions de-
fined by a distance measure (Algorithm 1), while at mini-
mization step, Pθ tries to recover the original sample x by
minimizing the same distance (Algorithm 2).
3.1. Self-Supervision
The automatic supervision signal to train NRP defense
is obtained via a loss-agnostic attack approach. Below, we
first outline why such a Self-Supervised Perturbation (SSP)
is needed and then describe our approach.
Motivation: Strong white-box attacks [15, 6], that are gen-
erally used for AT, consider already-known network param-
eters θ and perturb the inputs to create x′, such that they
are misclassified by the target model, i.e. T (x′;θ) 6= y.
Since the perturbations are calculated using gradient direc-
tions specific to θ, the resulting perturbed images x′ do not
generalize well to other networks [9, 43, 9, 53, 58]. This
dependency limits these attacks to a specific network and
task. In contrast, our goal is to design a self-supervised per-
turbation mechanism that can generalize across networks
and tasks, thus enabling a transferable defense approach.
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Figure 3: Fooling rate of Inc-v4 and average feature distortion
is shown for adversaries generated on Inc-v3 (black-box setting)
by I-FGSM and MI-FGSM. As the number of iterations increases,
fooling rate of I-FGSM decreases along with its feature distortion
while MI-FGSM maintains its distortion as iterations increase.
The self-supervised perturbation is based on the concept of
‘feature distortion’, introduced next.
Feature Distortion: Given a clean image x and its per-
turbed counterpart x′ that is crafted to fool the target model
T (·), the feature distortion refers to the change that x′
causes to the internal representations of a neural network
F(·) relative to x. This can be represented by,
∆(x,x′) = d
(F(x;θ)|n,F(x′;θ)|n), (1)
where, F(x;θ)|n denotes the internal representation ob-
tained from the nth layer of a pretrained deep network F(·)
and d(·) is a distance metric which can be `p [14], Wasser-
stein distance [1] or cosine similarity between the features
of the original and perturbed sample.
The reason why we base our self-supervised perturba-
tion on feature distortion is its direct impact on the pertur-
bation transferability. To show this, we conduct a proof-
of-concept experiment by generating adversarial examples
Algorithm 1 SSP: Self-Supervised Perturbation
Require: A feature extractor Fψ , batch of clean samples x, in-
put transformation R, perturbation budget , step-size κ, and
number of iterations T .
Ensure: Perturbed sample x′ with ‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤ .
1: g0 = 0; x′ = R(x);
2: for t = 1 to T do
3: Forward pass x′t to Fψ and compute ∆ using Eq. 1;
4: Compute gradients gt = ∇x ∆(xt,x′);
5: Generate adversaries using;
x′t+1 = x
′
t + κ · sign(gt); (2)
6: Project adversaries in the vicinity of x
x′t+1 = clip(x
′
t+1, x− , x + ); (3)
7: end for
8: return x′ = x′T .
on ImageNet-NeurIPS [7]. We consider two popular at-
tack methods, MI-FGSM [9] and I-FGSM [15], among
which MI-FGSM has higher transferability compared to I-
FGSM. Interestingly, feature distortion strength of I-FGSM
decreases as the number of attack iterations increases, com-
pared to MI-FGSM (Fig. 3). MI-FGSM maintains its pertur-
bation strength with increasing number of iterations. This
indicates that feature distortion has a direct impact on trans-
ferability and therefore maximizing the objective in Eq. 1
(signifying feature-space distortion) can boost the transfer-
ability of adversarial examples without using any decision
boundary information. Based on this observation, our pro-
posed perturbation generation approach directly maximizes
the distortion in deep feature space to create strong, highly
generalizable and task-independent adversarial examples.
Self-supervised Perturbation: Conventional black-box at-
tacks operate in the logit-space of deep networks. The ob-
jective of ‘logit-based’ adversarial attacks is to change the
target model’s prediction for a clean image T (x) 6= T (x′)
such that x′ is bounded: ‖x− x′‖ ≤ . In contrast to these
methods, we propose to find adversaries by maximizing the
feature loss (Sec. 3.2) of neural networks. Our approach
does not rely on decision-boundary information since our
‘representation-based’ attack directly perturbs the feature
space by solving the following optimization problem:
max
x′
∆(x,x′) subject to: ‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ , (4)
Our proposed method to maximize feature distortion for
a given input sample is summarized in Algorithm 1. We ap-
ply a transformationR to input x at the first iteration (Algo-
rithm 1) to create a neural representation difference between
an adversarial and benign example and then maximize the
difference within a given perturbation budget. There can
be different choices for R but in this work, R simply adds
random noise to the input sample, i.e. our algorithm takes a
random step at the first iteration.
Algorithm 2 NRP: Neural Representation Purification via
Self-Supervised Adversarial Training
Require: Training data D, Purifier Pθ , feature extractor Fψ ,
critic network Cφ, perturbation budget  and loss criteria L.
Ensure: Randomly initialize Pθ and Cφ.
1: repeat
2: Sample mini-batch of data, x, from the training set.
3: Find adversaries, x′, at a given perturbation budget  by
maximizing distance, ∆ (Eq. 1), using Algorithm 1.
4: Forward-pass x′ through Pθ and calculate LPθ (Eq. 8).
5: Back-pass and update θ to minimize LPθ (Eq. 8).
6: Update Cφ to classify x from Pθ(x′).
7: until Pθ converges.
3.2. NRP Loss functions
We propose a hybrid loss function that is used to train
the purifier network (see Algorithm 2). This loss function
consists of three terms that we explain below:
Feature loss: The Self-supervised Perturbation (SSP) gen-
erated by Algorithm 1 is the direct result of increasing the
feature loss function, ∆, defined on the feature extractor
Fψ . In order to learn the purifier network, we must decrease
this distance as follows:
Lfeat = ∆
(Fψ(x), Fψ(Pθ(x′)) ), (5)
where, ∆ is formally defined in Eq. 1, and the distance mea-
sure used to compute ∆ is the mean absolute error (MAE).
We empirically observe that removing Lfeat loss leads to
a network that does not converge to a meaningful state and
produces weaker defense (see Fig. 5).
Pixel loss: Smoothing images can help in mitigating the
adversarial effect since the perturbation patterns resemble to
that of noise. Therefore, in order to encourage smoothness,
we apply l2 loss in the image pixel space,
Limg = ‖Pθ(x′)− x‖2. (6)
Adversarial loss: Instead of using vanilla GAN objective,
we use relativistic average GAN which has shown better
convergence properties [23, 37]. For a given batch of origi-
nal, x, and adversarial examples, x′, the relativistic loss for
the purifier network Pθ is given as:
Ladv = − log
(
σ
( Cφ(Pθ(x′))− Cφ(x) ) ), (7)
where σ represents the sigmoid layer. The overall loss ob-
jective for Pθ is the combination of losses defined on pixel
and feature spaces as well as the relativistic loss:
LPθ = α · Ladv︸ ︷︷ ︸
Adversarial loss
+ γ · Limg︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pixel loss
+ λ · Lfeat︸ ︷︷ ︸
Feature loss
. (8)
The pixel and feature losses focus on restoring image con-
tent and style, while adversarial loss restores texture details.
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Figure 4: Fooling rate for Inc-v3 [26] on ImageNet-NeurIPS
dataset. Adversaries are created by applying SSP (Algorithm 1) at
different layers and best results for each model is selected. Percep-
tual adversaries found in VGG space has the highest transferability
(further analysis is in supplementary material).
3.3. NRP Architecture
Here, we outline the architecture of generator, feature
extractor and discriminator blocks. Generator (Pθ): Our
generator architecture is inspired by [27, 49]. It consists
of a convolution layer followed by multiple “basic blocks”.
Each basic block is composed of 3 “dense blocks” and each
dense block contains five convolutional layers followed by
leaky-relu [54] and finally a convolutional layer that has
output with same dimension as input. Generally, adding
a skip connection from input to generator’s output helps in
restoration tasks e.g., image super resolution [27] and de-
blurring [25]. However, in our case an important design
criteria is to avoid such skip connection since our objective
is to remove adversarial noise and a direct skip connection
can potentially reintroduce harmful noise patterns. Feature
Extractor (Fψ): It is a VGG [42] network pretrained on
ImageNet. During training, Fψ remains fixed while its re-
sponse is maximized in random directions (adversary gen-
eration process) and minimized (purification process) us-
ing a predefined distance metric. In our experiments, we
demonstrate the effectiveness of VGG space for creating
strong adversaries as compared to other deep architectures.
Discriminator (Cφ): Our discriminator architecture is also
based on VGG network [42]. It consists of five convolu-
tional blocks containing convolutional layers followed by
batch-norm and leaky-relu and then a fully connected layer.
3.4. On Suitable Perceptual Adversaries
The intuition to train NRP on boundary-agnostic per-
ceptual adversaries is based on the extensive study [57]
that found correlation of deep features with human percep-
tion. Specifically, [57] compares three models i.e. VGG
[42], AlexNet [24] and SqueezeNet [21]. Following [57],
we study these models from adversarial perspective by ap-
plying feature distortion at different layers in Fig. 4. Our
findings are as follows: (a) VGG’s perceptual adversaries
are more transferable than AlexNet and SqueezeNet (a de-
tailed transferability analysis on seen/unseen perturbations
of VGG is in supplementary material), (b) under same fea-
ture distortion settings, adversaries found at different layers
are not equally transferable e.g. conv3.3 (block 3, layer 3)
features offer better adversarial transferability than the rest
of the network. We believe this is because the initial VGG
layers learn low-level features while the deeper ones be-
come too specific to the label space. Further, we found that
increasing the representation loss at multiple network layers
does not notably increase attack success rate and adds a sig-
nificant computational overhead. Since NRP training pro-
cess is agnostic to the label-space of the source model i.e.,
it neither depends on a particular task-specific loss func-
tion (e.g., cross entropy) nor on the ground-truth labels, this
makes it a generic algorithm, which can defend a totally
unseen model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that perturba-
tions discovered with our SSP approach offer high transfer-
ability across models trained on different datasets and tasks.
4. Experiments
4.1. Training Details
Training is done on randomly selected 25k images from
MS-COCO data set. These images are resized to 480 ×
480 × 3. Adversaries created using SSP are fed as inputs
to NRP with their corresponding clean images used as tar-
get labels. During training, we randomly crop images of
128 × 128 × 3. Batch size is set to 16 and training is
done on four Tesla v100 GPUs. Learning rates for gener-
ator and discriminator are set to 10−4, with the value of
α = 5 × 10−3, γ = 1 × 10−2 and λ = 1. We study eight
models trained on the ImageNet [39]. Five of these models
are naturally trained. These include Inceptionv3 (Inc-v3)
[45], Inceptionv4 (Inc-v4), Inception Resnet v2 (IncRes-v2)
[44], Resnet v2-152 (Res-152) [20] and VGG-19 [42]. The
other three models including Adv-v3 [26], Inc-v3ens3 and
IncRes-v2ens [48] are adversarially trained. The specific de-
tails about these models can be found in [26, 48].
4.2. Defense Results and Insights
(a) Generalizability Across Attacks: Figs. 6, 7 & 8
demonstrate generalization ability of NRP to recover im-
ages from strong adversarial noise. Quantitative analysis
in Table 1 shows that compared to previously broken de-
fenses [10], NRP achieves strong robustness against state-
of-the-art attacks [53, 10], bringing down the effectiveness
of the ensemble translation-invariant attack with input di-
versity (DIMTI ) [10] from 79.8% to 31.9%.
(b) NRP as Cross-task Defense: In order to measure
the cross-task defense capabilities, we deploy NRP against
cross-domain attack (CDA) [37], a state-of-the-art attack
that generates diverse cross-domain adversarial perturba-
tions. Results in Table 2 demonstrate that NRP success-
fully removes all unseen perturbations and proves a generic
cross-task defense for classification, object detection and in-
Table 1: Robustness of different defense methods against state-
of-the-art black-box attacks (lower is better). IncRes-v2ens is used
as backbone model following [10]. NRP significantly reduces the
attack success rate. Adversaries ( ≤ 16) are created against Inc-
v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, Res-v2-152 and Ensemble.
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v3
JPEG [17] 19.9 25.5 20.3 28.2 30.7 37.0
TVM [17] 18.8 30.7 19.4 34.9 24.4 44.2
NIPS-r3 [47] 9.8 24.5 12.9 26.7 18.0 41.4
R&P [50] 6.5 19.8 8.7 23.9 13.3 36.8
HGD [28] 2.1 18.4 6.9 25.7 9.7 38.3
APE-GAN [41] 19.6 28.0 17.9 30.4 23.6 38.6
SR [35] 23.0 36.7 23.6 38.3 32.5 49.0
NRP 3.2 4.8 4.5 9.1 5.1 11.0
In
c-
v4
JPEG [17] 21.8 27.9 26.0 31.6 38.6 43.5
TVM [17] 19.9 31.8 24.8 38.4 29.1 45.6
NIPS-r3 [47] 11.5 24.6 15.6 29.5 14.1 41.9
R&P [50] 7.9 21.6 12.1 28.0 17.2 39.3
HGD [28] 2.6 18.1 9.6 27.8 32.4 58.7
APE-GAN [41] 21.1 28.8 20.7 32.8 25.0 39.0
SR [35] 25.3 34.1 29.2 42.3 39.3 52.3
NRP 3.1 4.4 4.8 10.3 5.2 12.5
In
cR
es
-v
2
JPEG [17] 24.7 32.4 31.6 45.9 47.2 55.7
TVM [17] 23.4 38.5 34.4 55.4 41.7 66.2
NIPS-r3 [47] 13.3 31.4 22.7 46.2 37.6 61.5
R&P [50] 9.9 28.1 18.6 45.2 30.2 61.4
HGD [28] 3.9 25.4 19.6 45.1 32.4 58.7
APE-GAN [41] 24.7 36.8 30.4 50.5 36.3 60.5
SR [35] 27.6 42.4 42.6 62.1 54.3 72.2
NRP 3.5 6.9 7.6 18.7 7.5 20.8
R
es
-v
2-
15
2
JPEG [17] 24.0 32.7 31.2 38.3 42.4 50.8
TVM [17] 22.0 38.1 24.5 41.2 36.8 55.7
NIPS-r3 [47] 12.5 30.1 18.0 34.4 34.4 52.9
R&P [50] 8.6 27.4 14.6 31.1 26.4 50.4
HGD [28] 3.6 24.4 15.1 31.8 32.6 51.8
APE-GAN [41] 24.3 37.1 23.2 38.6 34.3 53.8
SR [35] 26.3 41.8 30.2 49.2 48.4 63.9
NRP 3.4 6.5 5.8 11.9 6.3 17.8
E
ns
em
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e
JPEG [17] 38.1 43.3 67.7 77.2 82.5 83.4
TVM [17] 30.0 39.8 50.1 72.1 64.1 79.8
NIPS-r3 [47] 19.8 33.9 43.9 71.4 63.7 83.1
R&P [50] 13.8 31.2 32.8 68.3 51.7 81.4
HGD [28] 4.9 29.9 38.6 73.3 57.7 82.6
APE-GAN [41] 32.0 42.1 44.6 69.3 59.6 74.5
SR [35] 38.1 45.8 65.2 79.9 79.3 84.9
NRP 3.7 7.9 10.1 27.8 11.4 31.9
stance level segmentation against CDA.
(c) Ablation: Fig. 5 thoroughly investigates the impact of
different training mechanisms in combination with our de-
fense, and provides the following insights: (i) Relativistic
GAN loss offers a more robust solution than vanilla GAN,
(ii) NRP performance decreases slightly without pixel loss,
(iii) NRP without feature loss loses supervisory signal de-
fined by perceptual-space boundary, hence the generator
Table 2: NRP generalizability across different adversarial attacks.
Classification model is defended against CDA trained against Inc-
v3 while detection and segmentation models are defended against
CDA trained against Res-v2-152 (higher is better). (q=quantity,
w=weights, win=window size)
Classification: Defending IncRes-v2ens [48] against CDA [37]
Method No ImageNet Comics Paintings
Attack l∞≤8 l∞≤16 l∞≤8 l∞≤16 l∞≤8 l∞≤16
No Defense 97.8 83.0 30.9 94.0 56.6 71.6 23.7
JPEG (q=75) 97.6 74.9 18.6 90.1 42.6 68.0 18.0
JPEG (q=50) 96.2 74.2 19.0 90.1 43.4 66.0 19.2
JPEG (q=20) 94.1 73.4 21.7 87.0 51.3 62.7 18.8
TVM (w=10) 93.1 82.3 30.2 91.0 77.2 72.7 27.4
TVM (w=30) 96.0 81.1 27.3 93.4 66.4 70.6 24.1
MF (win=3) 95.4 77.3 27.7 92.4 66.8 65.0 22.1
NRP 95.6 95.7 96.0 95.4 94.2 95.3 94.1
Detection: Defending Mask-RCNN [18] against CDA [37]
No Defense 59.9 35.2 8.1 40.5 16.8 41.7 14.8
JPEG (q=75) 57.6 41.3 11.9 41.6 19.4 44.5 18.3
JPEG (q=50) 54.6 41.7 14.5 39.5 18.5 47.7 19.9
JPEG (q=20) 39.7 30.7 15.1 28.2 14.7 30.5 15.3
TVM (w=10) 54.1 32.1 14.3 40.5 28.9 37.6 21.5
TVM (w=30) 58.0 39.9 10.1 46.8 21.0 45.4 17.2
MF (win=3) 54.7 32.1 9.0 41.1 20.4 37.6 15.2
NRP 54.4 51.5 50.3 53.5 53.7 53.2 54.3
Segmentation: Mask-RCNN [18] defense against CDA [37]
No Defense 56.8 32.4 7.3 37.6 15.5 39.1 13.8
JPEG (q=75) 54.4 38.5 11 38.5 17.8 41.7 16.9
JPEG (q=50) 51.5 38.9 13.4 36.6 17.3 40 18.2
JPEG (q=20) 37.1 28.8 14.0 26.3 13.8 28.3 14.3
TVM (w=10) 50.8 29.8 13.2 37.6 26.6 34.9 19.8
TVM (w=30) 54.4 37.1 9.3 43.7 19.3 42.3 15.9
MF (win=3) 51.5 29.8 8.3 36.0 18.8 34.9 13.9
NRP 51.3 48.4 47.3 50.3 50.8 50.2 51.4
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Figure 5: Ablation. Proposed NRP is able to recover input sam-
ples from the strong black-box ensemble attack [10] as compared
to GNP and FGSP. NRP trained withoutLfeat performs poorly in-
dicating the importance of perceptual loss. Top-1 accuracy (higher
is better) is reported for IncRes-v2ens [48] on ImageNet-NeurIPS.
does not converge to a meaningful state, (iv) Gaussian
smoothing (Gaussian noise data augmentation) proves to
be useful in reducing adversarial vulnerability of classifier
[8, 55]. Training NRP as a Gaussian denoiser, named Gaus-
Table 3: Success rate (lower is better) of BPDA [6] and DIMTI [10] attacks against NRP. Res-v2-152 [20] is combined with other purifier
networks (ResG [27], UNet [38]). Adversaries are then transferred to the naturally and adversarially trained models. NRP protects the
backbone network even when the attacker tries to bypass using BPDA technique. (attack iterations: 10,  ≤ 16)
Source Attack NRP Inc-v3 Inc-v4 IncRes-v2 Adv-v3 Inc-v3ens3 IncRes-v2ens
Res-v2-152 DIMTI 7 77.4 77.9 74.2 51.2 56.2 47.7
ResG ⊕ Res-v2-152 DIMTI ⊕ BPDA 3 29.7 26.2 19.6 22.3 22.1 16.1
UNet ⊕ Res-v2-152 DIMTI ⊕ BPDA 3 29.0 27.1 19.5 26.9 27.7 18.8
Afghan Hound (0.73, 7) Porcupine (0.64, 7) Erythrocebus Patas (0.53, 7) Guenon Monkey (0.77, 7) Crane (0.55, 7)
Monarch Butterfly (0.65, 3) Dung Beetle (0.90, 3) Lycaenid (0.94, 3) Lorikeet (0.94, 3) Flamingo (0.90, 3)
Figure 6: A visual illustration of NRP generalizability to different adversaries ( ≤ 16) (top: attacked; bottom: purified). Our method can
clean challenging adversarial patterns resulting from SSP applied to adversarially robust model [12]. Previous denoising methods are not
designed for this type of structured noise. IncRes-v2ens backbone is used here. (see supplementary material for more examples)
sian Noise Purifier (GNP) does not prove effective against
translation-invariant attacks [10], and (v) Training NRP to
stabilize FGSM adversaries (termed FGSP in Fig. 5) per-
forms relatively better than GNP.
(d) What if Attacker knows about the Defense: We study
this difficult scenario with the following criteria: (i) at-
tacker knows that the defense is deployed and has access
to its training data and training mechanism, and (ii) at-
tacker trains a local defense similar to NRP, and then uses
BPDA [6] to bypass the defense. To simulate this attack,
we train residual generator (ResG) [27] and UNet [38] with
the same training mechanise as described in Sec. 4.1. We
then combine BPDA [2] with translation-invariant attack to
bypass NRP. Under these challenging settings, NRP shows
a relative gain of 74% and 66% respectively for IncRes-v2,
IncRes-v2ens (see Table 3).
4.3. Self Supervised Perturbation as an Attack
Next, we evaluate the strength of SSP as an attack for the
tasks of classification, detection and segmentation.
Classification: Table 5 compares SSP with FGSM [14], R-
FGSM [48], I-FGSM [15], MI-FGSM [9], TAP [58] and
DIM [53] using their standard hyper-parameters (see sup-
Table 4: Cross-task SSP Attack: Pixel-level accuracy is shown
for SegNet-Basic [4] on Camvid testset [5], while mAP (with IoU
= 0.5) is reported for Mask-RCNN.
Problem Method No Attack SSP (l∞≤8) SSP (l∞≤16)
Semantic Seg. SegNet [4] 79.70 52.48 32.59
Instance Seg. Mask-RCNN [18] 56.8 29.4 8.8
Object Det. RetinaNet [30] 53.78 22.75 5.16
Mask-RCNN [18] 59.50 31.8 9.7
plementary material). The results in Table 5 provide the fol-
lowing insights. (i) SSP consistently demonstrates a strong
black-box adversarial transferability on both naturally and
adversarially trained models, bringing down top-1 accuracy
of IncRes-v2 [44] from 100.0% to 14.1%, (ii) While MI-
FGSM [9] and DIM [53] perform slightly better on adver-
sarially trained ensemble models [48] in terms of top-1 ac-
curacy, SSP shows comparable top-1 rate and surpasses in
terms of top-5 accuracy, and (iii) These results indicate that
decision-boundary based attacks flip the label of input sam-
ple to the near-by class category, while SSP being agnos-
tic to decision-level information pushes the adversaries far
from the original input category. Cross-task Adversarial
DIM [53]: Welsh Springer (0.52, 7) Purified: Pomeranian (0.88, 3) DIMTI [10]: Cocker (0.71, 7) Purified: Pomeranian (0.86, 3)
Figure 7: NRP successfully recovers diverse patterns from strongest black-box attacks (l∞ ≤ 16). IncRes-v2ens used as backbone.
CDA [37]: Adversarial Prediction for Adversarial Purified Prediction for Purified
Figure 8: NRP successfully removes perturbation generated by CDA[37] ( ≤ 16) and stabilizes Mask-RCNN [18] predictions.
Table 5: SSP as an attack for Classification. Top-1 (T-1) and Top-5 (T-5) accuracies are reported under untargeted l∞
adversarial attacks on ImageNet-NIPS with perturbation budget l∞ ≤ 16. ‘∗’ indicates white-box attacks.
Naturally Trained Adv. Trained
Attack Inc-v3 Inc-v4 Res-152 IncRes-v2 VGG-19 Adv-v3 Inc-v3ens3 IncRes-v2ens
T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5
R
e
s
-
1
5
2
FGSM [14] 55.1 81.1 62.6 85.1 18.9∗ 44.7∗ 65.0 86.5 43.9 70.4 64.6 85.8 76.9 93.5 87.9 98.2
R-FGSM [48] 60.8 84.3 68.4 88.1 14.6∗ 40.3∗ 71.9 90.3 55.8 71.4 74.8 92.3 81.1 96.0 87.1 97.5
I-FGSM [15] 80.9 96.7 85.3 97.8 0.9∗ 10.8∗ 93.1 98.8 75.9 94.8 89.2 99.2 90.5 97.9 94.6 99.5
MI-FGSM [9] 38.9 72.7 44.8 76.5 0.6∗ 2.9∗ 47.7 79.6 42.1 71.8 67.0 89.9 69.4 93.3 81.5 96.4
TAP [58] 48.2 - 55.7 - 7.6∗ - 55.2 - - - 49.2 - 57.8 - 64.1 -
DIM [53] 15.9 44.0 17.3 48.4 0.8∗ 3.0∗ 20.0 50.2 25.6 56.3 55.8 82.8 54.9 84.2 71.5 93.1
V
G
G
1
6
FGSM [14] 32.6 58.6 38.4 62.6 38.5 66.3 44.5 68.5 8.8 25.1 51.7 75.3 54.9 81.7 70.8 90.7
R-FGSM [48] 44.4 69.5 47.6 75.1 51.1 78.8 56.4 78.8 11.2 31.8 65.5 87.4 66.7 89.2 77.5 93.6
I-FGSM [15] 69.2 93.0 75.2 93.7 79.0 96.2 85.6 96.8 14.4 49.3 83.5 97.7 83.9 96.7 92.1 98.8
MI-FGSM [9] 20.4 45.0 19.7 43.2 25.2 53.8 26.8 53.8 1.5 12.1 43.0 70.9 42.0 72.7 62.0 86.8
TAP [58] 23.9 - 28.1 - 23.9 - 32.3 - - - 38.8 - 41.9 - 63.8 -
DIM [53] 14.7 38.8 16.6 39.0 21.0 48.0 21.5 45.7 0.6 7.6 35.8 65.8 31.8 60.8 53.7 79.5
FFF [34] 61.7 80.7 60.8 78.7 72.8 90.1 76.1 90.1 44.0 68.0 79.6 93.1 83.1 93.1 92.8 98.5
SSP 5.3 11.0 5.9 11.9 16.5 29.5 14.1 25.5 2.7 6.8 25.9 43.2 40.2 58.3 58.0 75.0
Attack: Since SSP is loss-agnostic, it enables attacks on
altogether different tasks. Table 4 explores SSP for object
detection and image segmentation. For Segmentation, the
self-supervised perturbations created on CAMVID [5] in
VGG-16 feature space are able to bring down the per pixel
accuracy of Segnet-Basic by 47.11% within l∞ ≤ 16. For
object detection, on MS-COCO validation set [31], mean
Average Precision (mAP) with 0.5 intersection over union
(IOU) of RetinaNet [30] and Mask-RCNN [18] drop from
53.78% to 5.16% and 59.5% to 9.7%, respectively, under
l∞ ≤ 16.
5. Conclusion
We propose a novel defense approach that removes
harmful perturbations using an adversarially trained puri-
fier. Our defense does not require large training data and
is independent of the label-space. It exhibits a high gen-
eralizability to the unseen state-of-the-art attacks and suc-
cessfully defends a variety of tasks including classification,
segmentation and object detection. Notably, our defense is
able to remove structured noise patterns where an adversar-
ial image is maliciously embedded into the original image.
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Supplementary: A Self-supervised Approach
for Adversarial Robustness
We first explore why Self-supervised Perturbation (SSP)
attack works in Appendix A. In Appendix B, we compare
NRP with conventional adversarial training (AT) method
known as feature denoising [52] in terms of adversarial
robustness and defense training time. Differences of our
proposed attack and defense from feature scattering [56]
method are discussed in Appendix C. Ability of SSP to fool
object detectors is compared against CDA [37] in Appendix
D. We show that different transformation based defenses,
JPEG, total variation minimization (TVM) and median fil-
tering (MF) are not effective against SSP in Appendix E.
Attack parameters against which our defense is evaluated
are provided in Appendix F. Finally, we visually demon-
strate NRP’s ability to remove different kinds of adversarial
perturbations in Appendix G.
Appendix A. Why Self-supervision Works?
Here, we highlight our intuition to create adversarial ex-
amples using feature space of VGG model [42].
• Neural Style Transfer: [11, 36] observed that the ability
to transfer styles improves with AT, a phenomenon often
related to VGG models [42] . On the other hand, VGG
networks are more vulnerable to adversarial attacks [11].
A hypothesis was presented in [11] that perhaps VGG ini-
tial layers are as robust as adversarially trained models
which allows better style transfer without AT.
• Transferability of Natural vs. Robust Layers: In addi-
tion to style transfer hypothesis [11], we explore the con-
nection between layers of VGG and adversarially trained
models in the context of adversarial attacks:
– Maximum Distortion of Non-Robust Features:
Datasets containing natural images contain both robust
and non-robust features [22]. Robust features can be
described by high level concepts like shape e.g. ear
or noise etc., while non-robust features can arise from
background or texture [13]. Ilyas et al. [22] argues that
neural networks can pick-up on non-robust features to
minimize the empirical risk over the given the data dis-
tribution and the transferability of adversarial examples
can be explained by these non-robust features in differ-
ent networks.
– Transferability: VGG’s ability to destroy non-robust
features translates to better transferability even without
any AT as compared to ResNet models (see Figures 1
and 2).
• Shared Representation Space: Our objective is to find
adversarial patterns that can generalize across different
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Figure 1: Fooling rate comparison is presented. NT and
AT represent naturally and adversarially trained models, re-
spectively. VGG16-NT and ResNet50-NT are trained on
ImageNet while ResNet50-AT [12] is adversarially trained
on a subset of ImageNet. Adversaries are created by apply-
ing distortion to the feature space of each model on NeurIPS
dataset and then transferred to naturally trained IncRes-v2
[44]. Adversaries found in VGG space have higher trans-
ferability. In comparison, transferability of feature space of
ResNet50 increases after adversarially training.
network architectures trained for different tasks (e.g. clas-
sification, objection detection or segmentation). These
are diverse tasks that do not share loss functions, dataset
or training mechanism. Decision-boundary based attacks
use model final response (e.g. logits in the case of classifi-
cation) that is specific to input sample which leads to task-
specific perturbations. A network’s feature space, how-
ever, is shared regardless the input category. Therefore,
perturbations found in such a space are highly generaliz-
able (see Figure 3).
Appendix B. Comparison with AT
Conventional AT methods, such as [52], lose clean ac-
curacy to gain adversarial robustness. Take an example of
ResNet152 adversarially trained by [52]. In order to gain
55.7% robustness ( ≤ 16) against targeted PGD attacks
with ten number of iterations, the model clean accuracy
drops from 78% to 65.3% which is even lower than VGG11.
In contrast, our approach does not suffer from performance
degradation on clearn samples.
Appendix B.1. Defense Results
To compare against [52], we ran ten number of PGD at-
tack iterations. Labels for this targeted attack were chosen
randomly as suggested by [52]. It is important to note that
NRP can be turned into a dynamic defense, for example
Clean Image Adversarial: ResNet50-NT Adversarial: VGG16-NT Adversarial: ResNet50-AT
Figure 2: A visual demonstration of adversaries found by SSP in the feature space of diffrent networks. Perturbation buget is
set to l∞ ≤ 16. NT and AT represent naturally and adversarially trained models, respectively.
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Figure 3: t-SNE [32] visualization of logits vs. feature representation of randomly selected classes from ImageNet validation set. Logits
are computed from VGG16 [42] last layer while features are extracted from ”Block3-Conv3” of the same model. Our intuition is based on
the observation that features space is shared among input samples rather than the logit space. Attacking such shared representation space
removes task dependency constraint during adversary generation optimization and produces generalizable adversarial examples.
by first taking a random step in the input space and then
projecting the modified input sample onto the perceptual
space using our NRP. This way, NRP can be used to de-
fend against attacks that try to incorporate NRP during at-
tack optimization (a white box setting). We demonstrate
this behavior in Table 1 by incorporating NRP in PGD at-
tack using backpass approach introduced in [2]. Even for
this challenging scenario, NRP shows significantly higher
robustness than [52] while maintaining a higher clean accu-
racy. This highlights the benefit of self-supervision in AT.
Method Clean Adversarial
 ≤ 16/255
Original 78.31 0.66
Feature Denoising[52] 65.3 55.7
NRP 73.5 ± 1.5 63.0 ± 2.0
Table 1: Defense success in terms of accuracy on ImageNet
validation set (50k images). Higher is better.
Appendix B.2. Training Cost
Conventional AT methods like [52] depend on number
of classes, dataset and task. In contrast, our defense is inde-
pendent of such constraints. We describe the computational
benefits of our defense with feature denoising based AT [52]
in Table 2. Training time of our defense remains the same
regardless of the backbone model while training time for
[52] increases with the model size. In conclusion, conven-
tional AT requires large amount of labelled data (e.g., [52]
is trained on 1.3 million images of ImageNet), while our
defense can be trained on small unlabelled data (e.g., 25k
unlabelled MS-COCO images).
Method No. of Training Task/Label Dataset
GPUs Time Dependency Specific
[52] 128 52 Yes Yes
NRP 4 28 No No
Table 2: Comparison of training time (hours) between NRP
and AT on ResNet152 model [52].
Appendix C. Comparison with [56]
Defense comparison: Feature Scattering (FS) [56] based
AT remains model and task-specific. Instead, our defense is
independent to the target model and task, thereby providing
better generalizability.
Attack comparison: The proposed attack FSA [56] oper-
ates in logit space in an unsupervised way by maximizing
Optimal Transport distance, as compared to our SSP which
operates in perceptual feature space (e.g., VGG features).
we compare the transferability of their attack with our SSP.
As demonstrated in Table 3, SSP performs favorably well
against FSA.
Attack Inc-v3 Inc-v4 Res-152 IncRes-v2 Adv-v3 IncRes-v2ens
FSA [56] 60.4 64.2 68.8 71.0 72.2 88.6
SSP 5.3 5.9 16.5 14.1 25.9 58.0
Table 3: Transferability ( ≤ 16) comparison of FSA
with our attack (SSP). Results are reported for ImageNet-
NeurIPS dataset. Lower is better.
Appendix D. SSP vs. CDA
We compare our SSP with a recent transferable attack
[37] in Table 4 on MS-COCO validation set using Mask-
RCNN. mAP is reported with IoU = 0.5.
Appendix E. Effect of Input Transformations
on SSP Attack
Different input transformations have been proposed to
mitigate the adversarial effect. We have tested strength of
SSP attack against well studied transformations including:
• JPEG: This transformation reduces adversarial effect by
removing high frequency components in the input image.
• Total Variation Minimization (TVM): TVM measures
small variations thus it can be effective against relatively
smaller adversarial perturbations.
• Median Filtering (MF): This transformation filters out the
input image by replacing each pixel with the median of its
neighboring pixels.
We report our experimental results on segmentation and ob-
ject detection tasks.
Segmentation: SSP attack created on CAMVID [5] was
able to bring down per pixel accuracy of Segnet-Basic by
47.11% within l∞ ≤ 16 (see Table 6 and Figure 4). JPEG
and TVM transformations are slightly effective but only at
the cost of drop in accuracy on benign examples.
Object Detection: RetinaNet [30] collapses in the pres-
ence of adversaries found by SSP on MS-COCO validation
set. Its mean average precision (mAP) with 0.5 intersection
over union (IOU) drops from 53.78% to 5.16% under per-
turbation budget l∞ ≤ 16 (see Table 7 and Figure 5). TVM
Attack  ≤ 8/255  ≤ 16/255
CDA-ImageNet 35.2 8.1
CDA-Comics 40.5 16.8
CDA-Paintings 41.7 14.8
SSP 31.8 9.7
Table 4: SSP is compared with CDA [37]. Lower is better.
is relatively more effective compared to other transforms
against the SSP.
Appendix F. Attack Parameters
For FGSM, we use a step size of 16. For R-FGSM, we
take a step of size α=16/3 in a random direction and then
a gradient step of size 16−α to maximize model loss. The
attack methods, I-FGSM, MI-FGSM and DIM, are run for
10 iterations. The step size for these attacks is set to 1.6, as
per the standard practice. The momentum decay factor for
MI-FGSM is set to 1. This means that attack accumulates
all the previous gradient information to perform the current
update and is shown to have the best success rate [9]. For
DIM, the transformation probability is set to 0.7. In the
case of FFF [34], we train the adversarial noise for 10K it-
erations to maximize the response at the activation layers of
VGG-16 [42]. For the SSP, we used VGG-16 [42] conv3-3
feature map as the feature loss. Since SSP generation ap-
proach maximizes loss w.r.t a benign example, it does not
suffer from the over-fitting problem. We run SSP approach
for the maximum number of 100 iterations. The transfer-
ability of different attacks is compared against the number
of iterations in Figure 6. MI-FGSM and DIM quickly reach
to their full potential within ten iterations. The strength of I-
FGSM strength decreases, while feature distortion strength
(SSP) increases with the number of attack iterations. Top-1
(T-1) and Top-5 (T-5) accuracies of Imagenet trained mod-
els on NeurIPS dataset are reported in Table 5.
Appendix G. Generalization to Unseen Attacks
We show visual demonstration (see Figures 7, 8, 9 and
10) of how our defense, NRP, trained using SSP attack is
able to generalize on the variety of unseen perturbations
created by different attack algorithms. NRP successfully
removes the perturbations that it never saw during training.
• Figure 7 shows adversaries coming from adversarially ro-
bust model. It’s the most difficult case as perturbations
does not resemble to a noisy patter rather represent mean-
ingful structured pattern that are in-painted into the clean
image. NRP’s ability to remove such difficult patterns
shows that our defense can separate the original signal
from the adversarial one.
(a) Original (b) Prediction for Original (c) Adversarial (d) Prediction for Adversarial
Figure 4: Segnet-Basic output is shown for different images. (a) is the original image, while (b) shows predictions for the
original image. (c) is the adversary found by SSP attack, while (d) shows predictions for the adversarial image. Perturbation
budget is l∞ ≤ 16.
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Figure 5: RetinaNet detection results are shown for different images. (a) and (c) show detection for the original images, while
(b) and (d) show detection for adversaries found using SSP attack.
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Figure 6: Accuracy of Inc-v3 for adversaries created on
VGG-16 by different attacks. SSP’s strength increases with
number of iterations, in contrast to MI-FGSM and DIM.
• NRP has no difficulty in removing thick patterns intro-
duced by DIM or smooth perturbations of DIM-TI attacks
(Figure 8).
Table 5: Model accuracies are reported on original data set ImageNet-NIPS containing benign examples only. T-1: top-1 and
T-5: top-5 accuracies. Best performances are shown in bold.
Accuracy Naturally Trained Adv. Trained
Inc-v3 Inc-v4 Res-152 IncRes-v2 VGG-19 Adv-v3 Inc-v3ens3 IncRes-v2ens
T-1 95.3 97.7 96.1 100.0 85.5 95.1 93.9 97.8
T-5 99.8 99.8 99.9 100.0 96.7 99.4 98.1 99.8
Table 6: Segnet-Basic accuracies on CAMVID test set with
and without input transformations against SSP. Best perfor-
mances are shown in bold.
Method No Attack SSP
l∞ ≤ 8 l∞ ≤ 16
No Defense 79.70 52.48 32.59
JPEG (quality=75) 77.25 51.76 32.44
JPEG (quality=50) 75.27 52.45 33.16
JPEG (quality=20) 68.82 53.08 35.54
TVM (weights=30) 73.70 55.54 34.21
TVM (weights=10) 70.38 59.52 34.57
MF (window=3) 75.65 49.18 30.52
Table 7: mAP (with IoU = 0.5) of RetinaNet is reported on
MS-COCO validation set with and without input transfor-
mations against SSP. Best performances are shown in bold.
Method No Attack SSP
l∞ ≤ 8 l∞ ≤ 16
No Defense 53.78 22.75 5.16
JPEG (quality=75) 49.57 20.73 4.7
JPEG (quality=50) 46.36 19.89 4.33
JPEG (quality=20) 40.04 19.13 4.58
TVM (weights=30) 47.06 27.63 6.36
TVM (weights=10) 42.79 32.21 9.56
MF (window=3) 43.48 19.59 5.05
Adversaries produced by SSP using adversarilly robust features [12].
Purified adversaries by NRP.
Figure 7: NRP is capable to remove these difficult adversaries where adversarial image is in-painited into the clean image.
Untargetted adversaries are created by applying SSP to feature space of adversarially trained ResNet50 [12]. Perturbation
budget is set to l∞ ≤ 16.
Adversaries produced by DIM [53]
Purified adversaries by NRP
Adversaries produces by DIMTI [10]
Purified adversaries by NRP
Figure 8: NRP removes diverse patterns produces by DIM [53] and translation-invariant attacks [10] to a great extent.
Untargetted adversaries are created by ensemble of ensemble of Inc-v3, Inc-v4, IncRes-v2, and Res-152. Perturbation
budget is set to l∞ ≤ 16.
Adversaries produced by CDA [37] - ImageNet
Purified adversaries by NRP
Adversaries produced by CDA [37] - Paintings
Purified adversaries by NRP
Figure 9: Our defense successfully able to recover original samples from unseen adversarial patterns. These are untargeted
adversaries produced by CDA [37] trained against Inc-v3 on ImageNet and Paintings. Perturbation budget is set to l∞ ≤ 16.
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Figure 10: Adversaries generated by CDA [37] reduce Mask-RCNN [18] performance. NRP successfully removes adversarial
perturbations and greatly stabilizes Mask-RCNN predictions.
